in limbo over purgatory

Fire licks their shins as they struggle upward. Haunting images of their past sins heckle them as they climb. Finally, just as the pain reaches intolerability, a man in a shimmering white robe offers a helping hand and carries the relieved figures through the pearly gates of Heaven. That’s how I imagined it anyway, but David Brown’s article, No Heaven Without Purgatory, presents a Purgatory coinciding with both logic and basic Christian doctrine. The article intelligently blueprints the necessity of Purgatory in Christian theology, surprisingly extracting my view of Purgatory from the imagination and delivering it into the realm of possibility.

As he begins his article, Brown identifies two competing models of Purgatory. According to Brown, the popular notion of Purgatory today is as “a second chance for those of whom it might be argued…had no proper opportunities in this life” (447). However, rather than supporting this catch-all conception of Purgatory, Brown defends the “traditional” view of Purgatory. In this view there are two essential characteristics to Purgatory. First, Purgatory is a “place of moral preparation (not trial) for those whose lives and decisions had already destined them for Heaven” (447). Using a three-pronged set of arguments, Brown spends most of the article supporting this view. Then he finishes No Heaven Without Purgatory by describing the second attribute of Purgatory: the intense pain of self recognition that is in some manner a necessary atonement for our moral mistakes.

Brown begins with the “temporal argument” which offers a comparison between our moral character at death and our moral character in Heaven. Brown asserts that at death we are fallen, bearing the inescapable mark of human sinfulness. Conversely, in Heaven, by its very definition, we will be perfect. Since both premises seem solid, they pose an interesting dilemma; either we immediately jump from one moral state to another or there is period of transformation between the two states. Delving into the nature of our human state, Brown claims that as humans we exist through a process of continual change. Under such circumstances, we must experience a process like Purgatory following death, for an instantaneous shift from sin to perfection would defy our very humanness (447-450).

Next, using the “argument from identity,” Brown builds connections between our sense of self and the necessary existence of Purgatory. He suggests that our sense of self is founded primarily on our past. Thus, in the event of an instant transformation following death, Brown contends that while we would retain our past memories, we would find them fully incompatible with the perfection in which we then rest. In other words, our heavenly self would experience an inconceivable lack of connection with the sin of its previous self. Thus, according to Brown, an intermediary state like Purgatory would be necessary to sustain our sense of connection, without which we would fundamentally cease to be human (451-452).

The final characteristic that Brown ascribes as important to our humanness in the issue of Purgatory is our free will. Similar to our class discussions of evil, Brown explains that “morally and psychologically, respect for persons is thus held to take precedence over an objectively right decision” (453). Therefore, Brown entitles this argument the “argument from self-acceptance,” declaring that for us to enter heaven we must accept God’s divine grace. However, Brown argues that if we are suddenly whisked from death to heaven’s door, there is no opportunity to make such a decision (453-454).

Finally, Brown brings the article to a close by explaining the nature of the pain inherent in Purgatory. He draws a careful distinction between pain as a punishment and pain as a cleansing device. Christ already paid the punishment. In this system of Purgatory, pain functions internally as we come to acknowledge our sins and how we could have avoided hurting others. Our only penalty in Brown’s system of Purgatory is that of self-recognition

Overall, Brown’s vision of Purgatory is very compelling, yet it is not flawless. Throughout No Heaven Without Purgatory, he raises numerous objections which he later solves. Nonetheless, after reading the article, I stumbled upon two additional objections that Brown did not seem to address. I will begin by applying an objection to the “temporal argument.” According to this argument, we must undergo a process of change following death. However, the assumption that this process of change must be Purgatory seems to be false. The doctrine Purgatory springs from ideas concerning Heaven and Hell. These ideas originate in the Bible, but there is no mention of Purgatory. Instead the Bible speaks of a “final judgment.” During this event, God will judge mankind and Jesus Christ will defend us. Similar to an earthly court case, the “final judgment” will be both more than sufficient to clear our name and produce the necessary inner cleansing. This objection also stands its ground under the “argument from identity.” Postulating an event like the “final judgment” preserves our sense of identity with our earthly life. Through the event of our judgment, continuity between our earthly life and our life in heaven is maintained.

At first, this objection seems to offer a plausible counter-example to Purgatory. It seems to overcome the pitfalls of previous objections cited in the text. Both the objections raised in the text to the “temporal argument” insisted upon an abrupt shift between death and Heaven. However, the “final judgment” reaffirms the necessity of growth and change to our humanness. It is during this trial that we are confronted with our deeds and subsequently forgiven. Furthermore, because the “final judgment” is an alternative to Purgatory rather than an abrupt means of moving from death to Heaven, it also preserves our connectedness as discussed in the “argument from identity.” Nonetheless, the “final judgment” objection is not invincible. Although it appears to offer the inner change necessary to convert one from sin to purity, the case for inner change is more explicit in the traditional view of Purgatory, which by its definition entails an inner purgation of sorts. The “final judgment” objection also falls into trouble because of its close similarity to Purgatory; both are temporal states in which one is forced to undergo self-recognition prior to reaching Heaven. Therefore the two events could be misconstrued as identical. However, by returning to Brown’s definition of “traditional” Purgatory, we discover that unlike the “final judgment” Purgatory is not a trial.

Another brief challenge to the “argument from identity” which is not mentioned in the text is an objection to the notion that we “can identify ourselves only through continuity with our past” (451). The following objection also contradicts Brown’s claim that without an intermediate “stage between earth and heaven, the resurrected individual could have no reasonable grounds for believing himself to be the same person” as his earthly self (451). On the contrary, it seems that as earthly humans one means of personal identification is via our personality. Therefore, if there was an abrupt discontinuity between our state of purity in Heaven and our memories of sin, we would still share a significant link between our new selves and past selves. I believe this is an important oversight on the part of Brown and a noteworthy objection. Brown must either dismiss such an objection as false or modify his position. To reject the fact that personality is a fundamental trait of human beings seems to contradict both psychological research and common sense. Thus, it seems that Brown would be forced to change his position to one stating that “the resurrected individual would have insufficient grounds for believing himself the same person as” his earthly self. Unfortunately for Brown, the term “insufficient” is more of an opinion than an absolute and therefore it is less evident that an intermediate state is necessary.

Ultimately, despite these objections, Brown’s theory of Purgatory still seems to stand strong. Though the “final judgment” may offer a reasonable alternative to the traditional view of Purgatory, it does not seem to cast the idea of Purgatory into the graveyard of false doctrines. In fact, it may be possible for the two views to exist in harmony. Likewise, although my second objection may weaken the “argument from identity” it leaves Brown’s remaining arguments unscathed. In conclusion, I found Brown’s support for the necessary existence of a “place of moral preparation” through intense pain and self-recognition to be more than sufficient to warrant shifting my view of Purgatory from fantasy to possibility.